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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Lance Selleck appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion to dismiss or
modify the no contact order issued as a result of his conviction for felony violation of a no
contact order, stemming from a separate criminal case.  Mr. Selleck asserts that, because the no
contact  order  issued  in  this  case  fails  to  comply  with  the  requirements  of  Idaho  Criminal  Rule
46.2, the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In September of 2015, a Bonneville County judge signed a no contact order prohibiting
Lance Selleck from having contact with Chelaye Dodd, upon Mr. Selleck being charged with
misdemeanor  domestic  battery.   (R.,  p.61.)   Three  months  later,  the  State  filed  a  criminal
complaint charging Mr. Selleck with a felony for violating that no contact order for a third time.
(R., pp.6-7.)  Mr. Selleck waived his right to a preliminary hearing, was bound over into the
district court, and a two-part information was filed charging Mr. Selleck with felony violation of
a no contact order.  (R., pp.27-33.)  Pursuant to a binding plea agreement, Mr. Selleck pled guilty
as charged, the State dismissed additional charges filed in separate cases, and the parties agreed
the district court should impose a unified sentence of four years, with one year fixed.  (R., pp.44-
51.)   The  district  court  ultimately  agreed  to  be  bound  by  the  terms  of  the  plea  agreement  and
sentenced Mr. Selleck to a unified term of four years, with one year fixed.  (R., pp.54-58;
Tr., p.21, Ls.1-6.)1
1 The transcript prepared for this case does not include line numbers.  The line numbers noted in
this brief are based upon how official transcripts are ordinarily numbered, i.e., lines on each page
number from 1 to 25, from top to bottom.
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After pronouncing the sentence, the district court stated that it was ordering Mr. Selleck
not to have contact with Ms. Dodd for the next 50 years.2  (Tr.,  p.21,  L.20  –  p.22,  L.2.)   The
court  entered  a  written  order  the  substance  of  which  states,  in  its  entirety,  “IT  IS  HEREBY
ORDERED that the defendant shall have no contact with Chelaye Dodd for fifty (50) years, thus
expiring on April 6, 2066.”  (R., pp.59-60.)
Mr. Selleck filed a motion to either dismiss or modify the no contact order raising two
claims.  (R., pp.68-71.)  First, Mr. Selleck argued that the no contact ordered failed to comply
with  the  requirements  of  I.C.R.  46.2  in  that  it  lacked  any  distance  restriction,  an  advisory  that
failure to comply with the order could result in criminal charges, and there was no indication that
the  no  contact  order  was  served  on  Mr.  Selleck.   (R.,  pp.68-70.)   Additionally,  Mr.  Selleck
argued that district court lacked the jurisdiction to impose a no contact order for a period
exceeding the 5-year maximum sentence available for a felony violation of a no contact order,
pursuant to I.C. § 18-920.3  (R., p.70.)  The district court held a hearing and denied Mr. Selleck’s
motion.  (R., p.72; Tr., p.24, L.4 – p.32, L.7.)  Mr. Selleck filed a Notice of Appeal timely from
the district court’s order denying his motion to dismiss or modify the no contact order.
2 The plea agreement was silent on the issue of a no contact order.  (R., pp.44-48.)
3 During a hearing on the motion, Mr. Selleck’s trial counsel argued, as an issue of first
impression, that the court’s discretionary decision on the length of time a no contact order can
last is limited by the maximum penalty the court can impose for the underlying crime, equating a
no contact order to a term of probation.  (Tr., p.24, L.24 – p.26, L.8; p.30, Ls.6-17.)
3
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Mr. Selleck’s motion to dismiss or modify
the no contact order entered in this case?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying Mr. Selleck’s Motion To Dismiss Or
Modify The No Contact Order Entered In This Case
A. Introduction
The district court abused its discretion by denying Mr. Selleck’s motion to dismiss or
modify the no contact order issued in this case because that order did not comply with the
requirements of Idaho Criminal Rule 46.2.4
B. The No Contact Order Issued In This Case Does Not Comply With The Requirements Of
Idaho Criminal Rule 46.2; Therefore, The District Court Abused Its Discretion By
Denying Mr. Selleck’s Motion To Dismiss Or Modify The Order
“The decision whether to modify a no contact order is within the sound discretion of the
district court.” State v. Cobler, 148 Idaho 769, 771 (2010).  “The test for determining whether a
district court abused its discretion is:  (1) whether the court correctly perceived that the issue was
one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3)
whether it reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” Id. (citing Sun Valley Shopping Center
Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94 (1991)).  By acting outside the bounds of its discretion
and inconsistently with the applicable legal standards, the district court abused its discretion by
denying Mr. Selleck’s motion.
4 Mr.  Selleck  does  not  challenge  the  district  court’s  finding  that  “the  rules  and  statutes  in  the
State of Idaho” do not place a jurisdictional limit on the length of time a no contact order may
last.  (Tr., p.31, Ls.9-21.)  Although it appears that no Idaho appellate Court has weighed in on
the issue, the plain language of I.C. § 18-920 places no limitation on the length of time a no
contact order may last, and I.C.R. 46.2(a)(4)(b) indicates that a judge may modify a no contact
order.  Reading these two provisions of Idaho law in pari materia indicates that a judge has the
jurisdiction to modify a no contact order at any time during its existence, even after the court
loses jurisdiction over the criminal charges and/or conviction that led to creation of the no
contact order.
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Idaho Code § 18-920 grants a court the power to impose a no contact order upon any
person charged with or convicted of an enumerated crime, “or any other offense for which a
court finds that a no contact order is appropriate[.]”  I.C. § 18-920(1).  Based upon Mr. Selleck’s
guilty plea to felony violation of the no contact order issued in the misdemeanor domestic battery
case, the district court found it appropriate to enter a new no contact order.  (R., pp.56-60.)
Idaho Criminal Rule 46.2 is the mechanism the Idaho Supreme Court has adopted
governing the contents that must be included in no contact orders and reads, in relevant part, as
follows:
(a)  No contact orders issued pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-920 shall be in writing
and served on or signed by the defendant. Each judicial district shall adopt by
administrative order a form for no contact orders for that district. No contact
orders must contain, at a minimum, the following information:
(1)  The case number, defendant’s name and protected person’s name;
(2)  A distance restriction;
(3)  That  the  order  will  expire  at  11:59  p.m.  on  a  specific  date,  or  upon
dismissal of the case;
(4)  An advisory that:
(a)  A violation of the order may be prosecuted as a separate crime under
I.C. § 18-920 for which no bail will be set until an appearance before a
judge, and the possible penalties for this crime,
(b)  The no contact order can only be modified by a judge, and
(c)   When more  than  one  domestic  violence  protection  order  is  in  place,
the most restrictive provision will control any conflicting terms of any
other civil or criminal protection order. …
I.C.R. 46.2.  The no contact order issued by the district court in this case only partially complies
with the requirements of that rule in that it contains the case number (CR-2015-15413-FE), the
defendant’s name (Lance Selleck), the protected person’s name (Chelaye Dodd), and the
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expiration date (April 6, 2066 (although it does not state that the order will expire at 11:59 p.m.
on that date)).  (R., pp.59-60.)  However, the order lacks a distance restriction, a statement that it
will expire upon dismissal of the case (as an alternative to the expiration date), or any advisory
that that a violation may be prosecuted as a separate crime under I.C. § 18-920 for which no bail
will be set, that it can only be modified by a judge, or that where more than one protective order
is  in  place,  the  most  restrictive  provisions  will  control  if  any  of  the  terms  are  in  conflict.
(R., pp.59-60.)  Furthermore, while the certificate of service indicates that Mr. Selleck’s counsel
was served with the order, there is no indication that the written order was served on or signed by
Mr. Selleck.  (R., pp.59-60.)
The district court did not address or even recognize the requirements of I.C.R. 46.2 when
ruling on Mr. Selleck’s motion.  (Tr. p.30, L.19 – p.31, L.21.)  Instead, the court merely stated
that it felt a lengthy no contact order was appropriate in order to protect the victim, that it
complied with the requirement of a specific end date, and that Mr. Selleck had notice because the
court announced the no contact order in open court in Mr. Selleck’s presence.  (Tr., p.30, L.23 –
p.31, L.12.)5  While the court’s recital of the facts is accurate, this does not account for or excuse
the fact that the contact order in this case simply does not comply with all of the requirements of
I.C.R. 46.2.
5 During the hearing on Mr. Selleck’s motion, the prosecuting attorney appeared to refer to the
no contact order issued in the underlying domestic battery case, and relied upon the contents of
that order when arguing against Mr. Selleck’s motion.  (Tr., p.27, Ls.1-16.)  Indeed, a copy of the
order from the underlying domestic battery case appears in Clerk’s Record in this case.
(R., p.61.)  Regardless of the existence of that order (which the district court mistakenly dated
April 6, 2066, and ordered to expire at 11:59 p.m. on April 6, 2016), that order was not entered
in the present case, and is irrelevant to the issue raised in Mr. Selleck’s motion. Compare
R., p.61 (No Contact order filed in case number CR-2015-11960-MD) with R., pp.31-33
(Information filed in case number CR-2015-15413-FE).  The no contact order at issue in this
appeal was the no contact order entered by the court in this case, Supreme Court docket number
44395. See R., pp.59-60 (No Contact Order filed in CR-2015-15413).
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Idaho Criminal Rule 46.2 speaks in mandatory terms: “No contact orders issued pursuant
to Idaho Code § 18-920 shall be  in  writing  and  served  on  or  signed  by  the  defendant.  …  No
contact orders must contain,” information including a distance restriction, and an advisory about
the consequences of violating the order.  I.C.R. 42.6 (emphasis added).  The no contact order in
this  case  simply  states,  “IT  IS  HEREBY  ORDERED  that  the  defendant  shall  have  no  contact
with Chelaye Dodd for fifty (50) years, thus expiring on April 6. 2066,” and it was served upon
Mr. Selleck’s trial counsel, but not Mr. Selleck.  (R., pp.59-60.)  By failing to dismiss the no
contact  order,  or  modify  its  terms  so  that  it  complies  with  the  requirements  of  I.C.R.  42.6,  the
district court acted outside the bounds of its discretion and inconsistently with the applicable law.
As such, the district court abused its discretion by denying Mr. Selleck’s motion.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Selleck respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order denying
his motion to dismiss or modify the no contact order, and to remand his case to the district court
for further proceedings.
DATED this 17th day of February, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
JASON C. PINTLER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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